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We continue the analysis of quantum-like description of market phe­
nomena and economics. We show th a t it is possible to  define a risk inclina­
tion operator acting in some Hilbert space th a t has a lot of common with 
quantum description of the harmonic oscillator. The approach has roots in 
the recently developed quantum game theory and quantum computing. A 
quantum anthropic principle is formulated.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Bz
1. Noncommutative quantum mechanics
T he te rm  noncommutative quantum mechanics is m isleading as it sug­
gests th a t  th ere  m ight exist som ething like com m utative qu an tu m  m echan­
ics. In fact q u an tu m  theo ry  possesses various types of noncom m utativ itv  
bu ilt in since its  infancy. Nowadays th e  adjective “noncom m utative” reflects 
th e  possib ility  th a t  th e  space variables x % m ight no t com m ute. T his sort 
of generalizations has its  roo ts  in M -theorv (branes), deform ation quan tiza­
tion , W eyl quan tiza tion  and  curiosity  [1]. T his is, of course, connected w ith
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th e  Connes program  [2-4]. A m ong various possible generalizations th e  m ost 
popu lar one are
[ x \ x j ] = i6t j , <E C, (la)
[ x \ x j ] = i C t jkx k , C tjk e C ,  (lb)
x lx J =  q ^ 1 R 9 kixkx l i R 9 hi 9 C.  (lc)
In all these cases th e  index i takes values from  1 to  N .  We shall suppose
th a t  th e  ap p ro p ria te  algebra A x has a u n it elem ent [2,3]. Eqs. ( lb )  and (lc )
describe th e  so called Lie algebraic and  quan tu m  group generalizations, re­
spectively. Here we would be  in terested  in a generalization of th e  form  given 
by Eq. ( la )  which m ay be traced  back to  works of W evl [5] and  M oval [6 ].
2. Quantum market games
It was a com plete surprise  for us to  find th e  U niversity  of Bologna 
p rep rin t en titled  Quantum Mechanics and Mathematical Economics are Iso­
morphic and  w ritten  by L am bertin i [7]. W hen th e  p rep rin t appeared  we 
were ac tua lly  working on th e  d irect application  of recently  developed quan­
tu m  gam e theo ry  [8-10] in economics [11-16]. T h e  L am b ertin i’s p ap er was 
a fu rth e r incentive to  work harder. In th e  “s tan d a rd ” quan tu m  gam e theory  
one tries in som e sense to  quantize an  operational descrip tion  of “classical” 
versions of th e  gam e being analyzed. I t usually  enlarges th e  set of adm issi­
ble s trateg ies in a non triv ial way. We follow a different rou te. T h e  m arket 
players s trateg ies are described in term s of s ta te  vectors \fi) belonging to  
som e H ilbert space H  [12,13,15]. T h e  p robab ility  densities of revealing the  
p layers’, say Alice and Bob, in ten tions are described in term s of random  
variables p  and q:
M Y ) a \2 I W ) b !2 d d { )
A i m )  A bW #>B q P i  u
w here (q\'f)A  is th e  p robab ility  am plitude of offering th e  price q by Alice 
who w ants to  buy  and  th e  dem and com ponent of her s ta te  is given by |^ ) a  € 
H a - B ob’s am plitude (p|V’)b is in terp re ted  in an analogous way (opposite 
position). O f course, th e  “in ten tions” q and p  usually  do n o t resu lt in the  
accom plishm ent of th e  tran sac tio n  [13]. If one considers th e  following facts 
[11,17,18]:
•  error theory: second m om ents of a random  variable describe errors,
•  M. M arkow itz’s portfolio  theo ry  (Nobel P rize 1990),
•  L. B achelier’s theo ry  of options: th e  random  variable q2 + p2 m easures 
jo in t risk for a buving-selling stock tran sac tio n  (M erton k, Scholes won 
Nobel P rize in 1997)
th en  it seems reasonable to  define an  observable the risk inclination operator:
urns 0 1  (¿fc — Pfco) 2 , m uj2(Q k -  qk0)2H (V t , Qt ) . = ----- — ------+ -----------  , (3)
where p k0 := > <7fco :=  w :=  i f  • variable 0 denotes
charac teristic  tim e of tran sac tio n  [1 1 ] which is, roughly speaking, an average 
tim e span betw een two opposite moves of a player (e.g. buying and selling the  
sam e asset). T h e  p aram ete r m  >  0 m easures th e  risk asym m etry  betw een 
buying and selling positions. Analogies w ith  quan tu m  harm onic oscillator 
allow for th e  following charac terization  of q u an tu m  m arket gam es. T he 
constan t hpi describes th e  m inim al inclination  of th e  player to  risk. It is 
equal to  th e  p ro d u c t of th e  lowest eigenvalue of H (V k, Qk) and  29. 26 is 
in fact th e  m inim al in terval during  which it m akes sense to  m easure the  
profit. E xcept th e  ground s ta te  all th e  ad iaba tic  s trateg ies H (V k, Qk)\'f) =  
c o n s t.1^) are giffens [11,13] th a t  is goods th a t  do n o t obey th e  law of dem and 
and  supply. It should be no ted  here th a t  in a general case th e  o perato rs Qk 
do no t com m ute because trad e rs  observe moves of o ther players and  often act 
accordingly. O ne big bid  can influence th e  m arket a t least in a lim ited  tim e 
spread. Therefore, it is n a tu ra l to  apply  th e  form alism  of noncom m utative 
q u an tu m  m echanics w here one considers
[ x \ x k] = i,0 tk ~ i 0 £ t k . (4)
T h e  analysis of harm onic oscillator in m ore th a n  one dim ension [18] im ply 
th a t  th e  p aram eter 0  modifies th e  constan t He  —> \J h 2E + 0 2 and, accord­
ingly, th e  eigenvalues of H (V k, Qk). T his has th e  n a tu ra l in te rp re ta tio n  th a t 
moves perform ed by o ther players can dim inish or increase one’s inclination 
to  tak ing  risk.
3. M arket as a m easuring apparatus
W hen gam e allows a g reat num ber of players it is useful to  consider it 
as a two-plavers game: th e  trad e r \ 'f)k against th e  R est of th e  W orld (RW ). 
T h e  concrete algorithm  A  m ay allow for an  effective s tra teg y  of RW (for 
a sufficiently large num ber of players th e  single player s tra teg y  should no t 
influence th e  form  of th e  RW  s tra te g y ) . If one considers th e  RW  stra teg y  it 
m akes sense to  declare its  sim ultaneous dem and and  supply  s ta tes  because 
for one player RW  is a buyer and  for an o th er it is a seller. To describe 
such s itu a tio n  it is convenient to  use th e  W igner form alism . T he following 
subsection describe shortly  various aspects of quan tu m  m arkets.
3.1. Quantum Zeno effect
If th e  m arket continuously m easures th e  sam e s tra teg y  of th e  player, 
say th e  dem and {q\if), and  th e  process is repeated  sufficiently often for the  
whole m arket, th en  th e  prices given by som e algorithm  do no t resu lt from  
th e  supplying s tra teg y  (p\if) of th e  player. T h e  necessary condition for 
determ ining  th e  profit of th e  gam e is th e  tran sitio n  of th e  player to  th e  s ta te  
(p \y). If m any of th e  players sim ultaneously  change th e ir s trateg ies th en  the  
q u o ta tio n  process m ay collapse due to  th e  lack of opposite  moves. In th is 
way th e  q u an tu m  Zeno [20] effect explains stock exchange crashes. A nother 
exam ple of th e  quan tu m  m arket Zeno effect is th e  stab ilization  of prices of 
an  asset provided by a m onopolist.
3.2. Eigenstates o f Q and V
Let us suppose th a t  th e  am plitudes for th e  strateg ies {q\if)k or (p\'i()k 
th a t  have infinite in tegrals of squares of th e ir m odules, ({q\if)k 0  ¿ 2) have 
th e  n a tu ra l in te rp re ta tio n  as th e  will of th e  fc-th player of buying (selling) 
th e  am ount dk (sk) of th e  asset 0 .  So th e  s tra teg y  {q\i/i)k = id |°) =  H<ha) 
m eans th a t  in th e  case of classifying th e  player to  th e  set {kd}, refusal of 
buying cheaper th a n  a t c = ea and th e  will of buying a t any price equal or 
above ea. In th e  case of “m easurem ent” in th e  set {kd} th e  player declares the  
will of selling a t any price. T he above in te rp re ta tio n  is consistent w ith  the  
Heisenberg u ncerta in ty  re lation. T h e  strateg ies (q\'if)2 = (q\a) (or (p\'if)2 =  
(p\a)) do no t correspond to  th e  RW behavior because th e  conditions d2, s2 > 
0 , if always fulfilled, allow for un lim ited  profits (the  readiness to  buy  or sell 0  
a t any p rice ). T h e  dem and and  supply  functions give probabilities of coming 
off tran sac tio n s  in th e  gam e w hen th e  player uses th e  s tra teg y  (p |const.) or 
(q |const.) and RW, proposing th e  price, uses th e  s tra teg y  p.
3.3. Correlated coherent strategies
We will define correlated  coherent s trateg ies as th e  eigenvectors of the  
annih ilation  o p era to r Ck
1  /  %T \
C kiuv) ■■= ^ { 1  +  - j = = j Q k  E irfPk  , (5)
where r  is th e  correlation coefficient r  g  [—1,1], ¡j >  0. In these strateg ies 
buying and selling tran sac tio n s  are correlated  and th e  p ro d uct of d isper­
sions fulfills th e  Heisenberg-like u ncerta in ty  re la tion  A pA q3J l  — r 2 >  
and  is m inim al. T he ann ih ilation  o perato rs Ck and th e ir eigenvectors m ay 
be param eterized  by A p =  ^  , A q =  t anc  ^ r -
3.4. Mixed states and thermal strategies
According to  classics of gam e theo ry  th e  biggest choice of s trateg ies is 
provided by th e  m ixed s ta te s  p(p,q). T he m ost in teresting  am ong th em  are 
th e  th erm al ones. T hey  are characterized  by constan t inclination  to  risk, 
E ( H ( V , Q)) =  const, and m axim al entropy. T h e  W igner m easure for the  
n - th  exited  s ta te  of harm onic oscillator have th e  form
( ' _ ] ) ”  2H(p,q) 4 H ( n  a)
W n(pi q)dpdq = — -— e L n( ’— ) dpdq , (6 )
TXflE n-EOJ
w here L n is th e  n - th  Laguerre polynom ial. T h e  m ixed s ta te  py d e ter­
m ined by th e  W igner m easures W ndpdq w eighted by th e  G ibbs d is trib u tio n  
w n(P) ■= have th e  form
OO
PpiPi q)dpdq : =  )W n (p,q)dpdq
n=0
dpdq.= —  x  e- xH(p,q)
2ir * = 4 j t a n h ( / 3 ^ )
3.5. M arket cleared by quantum, computer
W hen th e  algorithm  A  ca lculating in a separab le H ilbert space H^ does 
no t know th e  players s trateg ies it m ust choose th e  basis in an  a rb itra ry  
way. T his m ay resu lt in a rb itra ry  long represen ta tions of th e  am plitudes 
of strateg ies. Therefore, th e  algorithm  A  should be looked for in th e  N P 
(N on-Polynom ial) class and q u an tu m  m arkets m ay be form ed provided the  
q u an tu m  com putation  technology is possible. Is th e  qu an tu m  arb itrage  pos­
sible only if th ere  is a un ique correspondence betw een H and Ii e 'I W as the  
hypo thetical evidence given by R obert Giffen in th e  B ritish  P arliam ent the  
first ever descrip tion of quan tu m  phenom enon? T he com m only accepted 
universality  of qu an tu m  theo ry  should encourage physicist in looking for 
traces q u an tu m  world in social phenom ena.
4. Conclusions
We th in k  th a t  th e  form alism  of q u an tu m  theo ry  m ay provide us w ith 
tools of unexpected  power th a t  com bined w ith  m ethods of gam e theo ry  m ay 
allow for m uch deeper understand ing  of financial phenom ena th a n  it is usu­
ally expected. Let us quo te th e  E d ito r’s N ote to  C om lexity D igest 2001.27(4) 
(h ttp :/ /w w w .c o m d ig .o rg ) “It m ight be  th a t  while observing th e  due cere­
m onial of everyday m arket tran sac tio n  we are in fact observing cap ita l flows
resu lting  from  q u an tu m  gam es eluding classical descrip tion. If hum an deci­
sions can be  traced  to  m icroscopic qu an tu m  events one would expect th a t  
n a tu re  would have taken  advantage of q u an tu m  com putation  in evolving 
com plex brains. In th a t  sense one could indeed say th a t  quan tu m  com put­
ers are playing th e ir m arket gam es according to  quan tu m  rules”. D uring 
th e  p ast decade options gained a significant position  in cap ita l tu rnover all 
over th e  world. It m ay m ean th a t  sim ple m ethods of m axim ization  of profit 
becam e unsatisfactory . At present m inim ization of financial risk is playing 
th e  key role. Lower risk m eans b e tte r  prognoses for in d u stria l and m arket 
developm ent and th is  resu lts in higher profits. M ethods of m inim azing the
financial risk will becom e a focus of investors a tten tio n . All th is  tem p ts
us to  form ulate  th e  quantum anthropic principle of th e  following form. A t  
earlier civilization stages markets are governed by classical laws (as classi­
cal logic prevailed in reasoning) but the incomparable efficacy o f quantum  
algorithms in multiplying profits1 will result in quantum behavior prevailing 
over the classical one. We envisage m arkets cleared by quan tu m  algorithm s 
(com puters) [1 1 , 2 1 ].
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